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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: AMERICAN AND
SOUTH AFRICAN DIMENSIONS
Johan D. Van der Vyver
In September 2002, a twelve-year old South African girl' prevailed
on two strangers to kill her grandmother, a business woman of Pietermaritzburg (59 years of age), with whom the girl was staying at the time.2 The
two strangers, Sipho Hadebe and Vusumuzi Tshabalala, were convicted and
3
sentenced to 25 years imprisonment for the murder of the grandmother.
Thereafter the girl was brought to trial.4 She, too, was convicted.5 In sentencing her, the trial judge, Swain, J., considered the options: imprisonment, correctional supervision and home-based supervision. 6 He decided
on the latter course. 7 The trial court postponed sentencing of the accused
8
for 36 months under stringent conditions.
The Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently decided that by not
sentencing her, the trial court was too lenient. 9 It consequently imposed a
sentence of seven years imprisonment, suspended for five years plus correctional supervision in terms of Section 276(l)(h) of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 for a period of 36 months and under much the same conditions as those upon which the suspension of sentencing were made conditional by the trial court.l0 For the period of 36 months, the girl was placed
under house arrest in the care and custody of her mother.'" She was to
continue her secondary school education (at the time of her appearance in
In South African law, the identity of a juvenile offender may not be made public, and since the name of the deceased might indicate who the child perpetrator
was, it too should not be published.
2
State v. P. Case No. CC 155/2003, Pmb. High Ct. (07 Oct. 2004) (S. Afr.)
available at http://www.childlawsa.com/docs/Swain.pdf.
3 Id. at5.
4

Id.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 304.
7 Id. at 305.
8 Id. at 304-07.
9 Director of Public Prosecutions Kwa Zulu Natal v. P. 2006 (3) S.A. 515 (S.
Afr.) [hereinafter "Kwa Zulu Natal v. P."].
I0 Id. at 528.
5

6

11 Id.
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court, she was 14 years old and in the ninth grade); she was permitted to
participate in school activities; she had to attend a program of the National
Institute for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NICRO)
focused on life skills and therapeutic courses and undergo regular therapy;
she was to receive medical and dental treatment as required; and upon attaining the age of 15, she was to render 120 hours per year of community
service.12 A correctional officer was instructed to visit her at least four
times per week at irregular intervals to ensure compliance with the terms of
3
the girl's confinement and to submit quarterly reports to the Court.'
The Court chose this course of action based on the best-interests-ofthe-child criterion, in terms of which emphasis in the sentencing of juvenile
offenders must always be on rehabilitation (rather than deterrence or prevention) and their reintegration into society.' 4 The Court also considered
international instruments dealing with juvenile justice issues, including the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.15 The South African
Constitution underscores this approach by providing that every child has the
right "not to be detained except as a matter of last resort, in which case...
the child may be detained for the shortest appropriate period of time,"' 6 and
by instructing courts of law to consider international law when interpreting
17
the constitutional Bill of Rights.
It might be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeal could find no
particular extenuating circumstances besides the age factor in this case.' 8
The girl persistently denied the allegations against her and showed no remorse.' 9 She drugged her grandmother before the event by putting sleeping
tablets in her tea.20 She witnessed the strangling of the deceased 2 ' and insisted that the perpetrators also cut the victim's throat to make sure she was
dead. 22 She invited her 6 year old brother to enter the room where the crime
was committed and while the corpse of the dead woman was still there.2 3
She permitted the perpetrators to ransack the deceased's home and to take
12

'3
14

15
16

17

Id. at 528-29.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 524.
Kwa Zulu Natal v. P., supra note 9, at 523.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 28(l)(g).
Id. § 39(1)(b).

18

Kwa Zulu Natal v. P., supra note 9, at 525.

19

Id.

20

Id.
Id.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 525.

21
22
23
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valuables from the house as a reward for their deed, and also promised
sexual favors to one of the killers. 24 She tried to fake an alibi.25 There was
no clear motive for the murder, except, possibly, that she had been reprimanded by the deceased for regularly running up an enormous telephone
bill to call her 20 year old boyfriend. 26 At more or less the same time a
similar crime was committed in the United States (hereinafter the "U.S.").
In November 2001, a 12 year old American boy, Christopher Pittman, shot and killed his grandparents, Joe Pittman (66 years of age) and Joy
Pittman (62 years of age). 27 On March 22, 2005, when he was 15 years of
age, Christopher was convicted by a jury in Charlestown, South Carolina of
the dual murders and sentenced to serve two terms of 30 years in prison on
the two charges. 28 Christopher was tried as though he were an adult, 29 and
30 years imprisonment is the minimum sentence prescribed by the law of
South Carolina for murder. 30 The Court ordered that the two sentences
were to run concurrently. 3 1 Christopher had to serve the first two years of
his sentence in a prison for juveniles, and when he turns 17 he will be
32
transferred to an adult penitentiary.
Closer scrutiny of the facts in the case will reveal that the accused
at the time of the crime on a regular basis used an anti-depression drug,
called Zoloft, 33 which, if taken by youngsters could, according to expert
evidence, create an inclination to commit suicide and a tendency toward
violent acts. 34 The jury rejected a plea of "involuntary intoxication" based
on this evidence, 35 holding that in view of his conduct at the time of the
offence and thereafter the accused was capable of distinguishing between
the right and wrong of his conduct. 36 This outcome does not reflect reduced
culpability for youthful offenders.
24
25
26

27
28
29
30

31
32

Kwa Zulu Natal v. P., supra note 9, at 519.
Id.
Id.

State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 151 (S.C. 2007).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 153.
Id.
See Kate Randall, 30 Years in Prisonfor Crime Committed by 12-year-old,

Feb. 19, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/
feb2005/juve-fl9.shtml.
33 State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d at 152.
WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE,

34

Id. at 170-71.

35 Id.
36

Id. at 154.
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Evidence was also produced to show that Christopher had a boisterous life history.3 7 He grew up in central Florida in the care of his father
after the mother left them (the mother being the daughter of the murdered
couple). 38 At one stage he ran away from home, and after an attempted
suicide he ended up in a psychiatric hospital.39 He subsequently moved in
with his maternal grandparents (the deceased) in South Carolina.40 The day
before the killings, he was involved in a brawl on the school bus with a
fellow learner, provoking a strong reprimand from the grandparents. 4' Except for the last-mentioned bit of evidence, which was considered as a possible motive for the murders, the rest of the background history did not
seem to feature in the verdict of, or sentence imposed by, the Court.
Several elements of the American criminal justice system are at
odds with international standards. There is the American practice of trying
a juvenile offender as an adult. 42 The emphasis in the penal policy of some
states is on the nature of the crime and not so much on the culpability of the
accused. 43 In addition there is the institution of minimum sentences for
juvenile offenders. 44 Juveniles are also treated as adults at a younger age
45
for purposes of detention.
All the states constituting the U.S. make provision for the prosecution of juveniles as though they were adults. 46 Different rules apply in different states as to the offenses for which this can be done, the procedure to
be followed in such cases, and the age upon which a juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult. 47 In some states, a juvenile court decides whether a juvenile offender is to be tried as an adult, while this occurs automatically in
37

Id. at 152.

38

Id.

39 State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d at 152.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See PATRICK GRIFFIN, NATIONAL CENTER
SENTENCING

JUVENILES AS

BLENDED SENTENCING

ADULTS:

LAWS

AN

FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRYING AND

ANALYSIS

OF STATE TRANSFER

AND

(2003), http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/pdf/

transferbulletin.pdf.
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id. at 8.
45 National Center for Juvenile Justice, State Juvenile Justice Profiles, What is
each state's minimum age for transfer to criminal court?, http://www.ncjj.org/
stateprofiles/overviews/transfer5t.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
GRIFFIN, supra note 42, at 1.

46
47

Id.
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other states in cases of certain serious offences. 48 The most common age
restriction for trying a juvenile as an adult is 14 years, 49 but in states such as
Kansas and Vermont the minimum age is as low as 10 years. 50 At the end
of 2007, altogether 23 states, including South Carolina, had no minimum
age upon which a juvenile could be transferred for trial from the juvenile
court to a regular criminal court. 51 In some states the decision to try a juvenile offender as an adult is almost exclusively based on the nature of the
52
crime and in disregard of the reduced culpability of the accused.
Although accountability is supposed to count for something when it
comes to sentencing of juveniles prosecuted as an adult, in actual practice
this in many cases seems to be fiction rather than truth. The sentence imposed in the case of Christopher Pittman should not be considered as some53
thing out of the ordinary. In dismissing an appeal against that sentence
the Court of General Sessions of South Carolina cited instances where a 13
year old defendant received a sentence of 100 years imprisonment, 54 where
a 15 year old defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, 55 where a defendant between the ages of 14 and 15 received a prison
sentence of 91/2 years, 56 where a 13 year old received a mandatory life
sentence 5 7 and where a 16 year old defendant received a life sentence without parole plus 60 years. 58 The ages cited here apply in all instances to the
convicted persons at the time the crime was committed.
I.

SOUTH AFRICAN ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL-LAW STANDARDS

The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter
places numerous obligations on States Parties to ensure its effective implementation at the municipal levels: recognize the inherent right to
"CRC") 59

48

Id.

49

National Center for Juvenile Justice, supra note 45.

50

Id.

51 Id.
52

GRIFFIN,

supra note 42, at 6.

State v. Pittman, 2005 W. L. 831970 (S.C.Gen.Sess.).
Id. at 2 (citing Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Id. (citing Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996)). See also State v.
Pilcher, 27085 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95); 655 So.2d 636.
56 Id. (citing State v. Ira, 2002-NCMA-037, 132 N.M. 8, 43 P.3d 359).
57 Id. (citing State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998)).
58 Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 1996 W.L. 580997 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)).
59 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter "CRC"].
53
54
55

86

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15

life of every child and ensure "to a maximum extent possible" the survival
and development of the child (art. 6); implement the right from birth of a
child to a name and a nationality (art. 7); combat the illicit transfer and nonreturn of children from abroad (art. 11); respect the right of the child to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 14); ensure the access of
children to information (art. 17); protect the child against all forms of physical violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment
or exploitation (art. 19), from economic exploitation (art. 32), and from all
forms of sexual abuse (art. 34); secure access of all children to health care
services (art. 24) and a standard of living adequate for the child's physical,
mental, spiritual, moral, and social development (art. 27); provide compulsory primary education free of charge to all children and make secondary
education available on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means
(art. 28); and much, much more. The Convention proclaims, most importantly, that in all of this "the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration" (art. 3).
The South African Constitution 60 upholds these principles almost to
a fault. It proclaims that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in all matters concerning the child (§28(2)); it affords to every child
the right to a name and a nationality from birth (§28(1)(a)); every child has
a constitutional right to family care, parental care, or appropriate alternative
care when removed from the family environment (§28(l)(b)), to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services, and social services (§28(l)(c)), and
to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation
(§28(l)(d)); as a matter of constitutional obligation, every child must be
protected from exploitative labor practices (§28(1)(e)), and may not be required or permitted to perform work or to provide services that are considered inappropriate for a child of that age (§28(1)(f)(i)), or would place at
risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral or social development (§28(l)(f)(ii)); the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to basic education, and the right to further
education (§29(1)). It is perhaps important to note that while the social
rights of persons enunciated in Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution are
subject to progressive implementation depending on the available resources
at the disposal of the State, a child's comparable rights to basic nutrition,
shelter, and health-care services have been proclaimed in the Constitution
as immediately enforceable rights. 6 1 In a recent judgment, the Constitutional Court noted that "the CRC has become the international standard
60 S. AFR. CONST. 1996

Centre for Child Law & Others v. MEC for Education, Gauteng, & Others 2008
(1) SA 203 (T) at 227 (S.Afr.).

61
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against which to measure legislation and policies, and has established a new
structure, modeled on children's rights, within which to position traditional
62
theories of juvenile justice.
The child, like everyone else, is also entitled to basic rights applying to the administration of justice, such as the rule against arbitrary arrests,
the proscription of detention without trial, protection against violence, freedom from torture and from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (§12(1)), and guarantees of the long list of basic norms of criminal
procedure pertaining to persons arrested (§2 8(g), read with §35(1)), in detention (§28(g), read with §35(2)), and accused of a criminal offence
(§28(g), read with §35(3)). Current South African law makes ample provision for alternative measures designed to avoid the detention of juveniles in
a prison and to orchestrate the rehabilitation and re-integration in society of
young offenders. This is evidenced by the punishment decided upon in the
case of the girl of Pietermaritzburg who, at the age of 12, arranged the
murder of her grandmother.
The judgment in that case also bears evidence of the constitutional
commitment of the "new South Africa" to abide by international standards
of human rights protection. Customary international law is (§232), and
self-executing international agreements are (§231(4)), part of the law of the
land unless such law is or agreements are inconsistent with the Constitution
or an Act of Parliament. The 1996 Constitution furthermore instructs courts
of law to prefer an interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law (§233). When interpreting the constitutional Bill of Rights,
courts of law are permitted to consider comparable foreign law (§39(1)(c)),
but are compelled to take international law into account (§39(1)(b)). They
are evidently precluded from following international law directives that are
at odds with constitutionally protected rights. 63 Reducing the age of majority to 18 years as of 1 July 200764 was an important step toward bringing
South African law in line with international standards.
The CRC altogether prohibits capital punishment and life imprisonment for juvenile offenders, 65 and furthermore provides that "detention or
S v. M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) at 245
(S.Afr.).
63 See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 565 (S. Afr.)
(stating that "[i]t would be a strange reading of the Constitution that utilised the
principles of international human rights law to take away a guaranteed right").
64 Children's Act 38 of 2005 s. 17; see also South African Government Information, Commencement of Certain Sections of the Children's Act, http://www.info.
gov.za/speeches/2007/07062915151003.htm (last visited April 27, 2009).
65 CRC, supra note 59, art. 37(a).
62

88
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imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period
of time."'66 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (hereinafter "The Beijing Rules") likewise provide that:
(a) The reaction taken shall always be in proportion not
only to the circumstances and the gravity of the offence but
also to the circumstances and the needs of the juvenile as
well as to the needs of the society;
(b) Restrictions on personal liberty of the juvenile shall be
imposed only after careful consideration and shall be limited to the possible minimum;
(c) Deprivation of personal liberty shall not be imposed
unless the juvenile is adjudicated of a serious act involving
violence against another person or of persistence in committing other serious offences and unless there is no other
appropriate response;
(d) The well-being of the juvenile shall be the guiding fac67
tor in consideration of her or his case.
The Beijing Rules further prohibit capital punishment and corporal
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles. 68 Much the same principles
are proclaimed in the 1999 United Nations Rules for the Protection of
69
Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty.
These international-law directives featured prominently in the sentencing of the twelve-year old Pietermaritzburg girl. Judge Belinda van
Heerden on one occasion summarized as follows the general approach to
the sentencing of juvenile offenders based on South African constitutional
provisions and international-law principles:
The judicial approach towards the sentencing of juvenile
offenders must therefore be reappraised and developed in
order to promote an individualised response which is not
Id. art. 37(b).
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, art. 17.1, G.A. Res. 40/33 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 53,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53/Annex (Nov. 29, 1985).
68 Id. art. 17.2-17.3.
69 United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty,
G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/
45/49/Annex (Dec. 14, 1990).
66
67
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only in proportion to the nature and gravity of the offence
and the needs of society, but which is also appropriate to
the nature and interest of the juvenile offender. If at all
possible, the sentencing judicial officer had to structure the
punishment in such a way so as to promote the reintegration of the juvenile concerned into his or her family and
70
community.
71
Taking the international standards into account (and actually citing them),
South African courts have laid down the following more concrete criteria as
part of the juvenile criminal justice system of the country:
(i) Wherever possible a sentence of imprisonment should
be avoided, especially in the case of a first offender.
(ii) Imprisonment should be considered as a measure of last
resort, where no other sentence can be considered appropriate. Serious violent crimes would fall into this category.
(iii) Where imprisonment is considered appropriate it
should be for the shortest possible period of time, having
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence and the
needs of society as well as the particular needs and interests
of the child offender.
(iv) If at all possible the judicial officer must structure the
punishment in such a way as to promote the rehabilitation
and reintegration of the child concerned into his/her family
or community.
(v) The sentence of life imprisonment may only be considered in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances
would be present where the offender is a danger to society
and there is no reasonable prospect of his or her
72
rehabilitation.
Provision is made in South African law for minimum sentences in cases of
certain serious offences. 73 However, the concerned legislation authorized a
court of law to impose a lesser sentence in the case of adult offenders (persons over the age of 18 years at the time the crime was committed) if it was
satisfied that "substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify
S. v. Kwalase 2000 (2) SACR 135 (C) at 139 (S.Afr.).
Afr.) (citing the CRC and the
71 S. v. Nkosi 2002 (1) SACR 135 (W) at 145 (S.
Beijing Rules).
72 Id. at 137.
73 See Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 s. 51(l)-(2).
70

90

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15

the imposition of a lesser sentence. '74 Minimum sentences do not apply at
all to child offenders under the age of 16 years. 75 As far as child offenders
between the ages of 16 and 18 are concerned, the Act provided:
If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) [that is, a
court under an obligation to impose a minimum sentence]
decides to impose a sentence prescribed in those subsections upon a child who was 16 years of age or older, but
under the age of 18 years, at the time of the commission of
the act which constituted the offence in question, it shall
enter the reasons for its decision on the record of the
76
proceedings.
The point of departure prescribed by this provision was clearly that a child
offender of between the ages of 16 and 18 at the time the crime was committed should not receive the prescribed minimum sentence. Should the
court decide to impose the minimum sentence, it must enter its reasons for
imposing the minimum sentence on the record of the proceedings. The Act
did not require "substantial and compelling reasons" for not imposing the
minimum sentence.
The rather strange wording of the above provision nevertheless
gave rise to conflicting interpretations. In the one set of cases, it was decided that the court was generally obliged not to impose a minimum sentence in the case of child offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 years, 77
while other judgments proceeded on the assumption that the applicable legislation generally allowed that the minimum sentences be imposed in such
78
cases.
Applying the sentencing guidelines laid down in the South African
Constitution and in international instruments, the Supreme Court of Appeal
in a subsequent judgment held that in the case of juvenile offenders of between the ages of 16 and 18, the sentencing Court "is generally free to
apply the usual sentencing criteria," though it should keep in mind that the
offences singled out for minimum sentences do deserve severe punish-

71
15
76

Id. s. 51(3)(a).
Id. s. 51(6).
Id. s. 51(3)(b).

S. v. Blaauw 2001 (2) SACR 255(C) at 294 (S. Afr.); S. v. Mofokeng 1999 (1)
SACR 502 (W) at 520 (S. Afr.); S.v. Nkosi 2002 (1) SA 494 (W) at 499 (S. Afr.).
78 See, e.g. Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v. Makwetsja 2004
(2) SACR 1 (T) (S. Afr.).

77
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ments. 79 The Court in that case substituted a prison sentence of eight years
for a life sentence imposed by the court a quo in a case involving the murder of a defenseless elderly person by his 17 year old neighbor. The judgment seemingly laid to rest controversies that had emerged from the
conflicting judgments of different branches of the High Court regarding the
interpretation of the statutory provision regulating the imposition of minimum sentences in the case of juvenile offenders of between 16 and 18 years
at the time the crime was committed. 80
But then the legislature intervened. It enacted the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 2007, which prescribed minimum sentences for certain
serious crimes in all cases where the perpetrator was over the age of 16
years when the crime was committed, but added that "if the accused person
was 16 years or older, but under the age of 18 years, at the time of the
commission" of the offence, a maximum of one half of the minimum sen8
tence may be suspended. '
This provision was applied in the case of Ntaka v. The State.8 2 In
that case, a 17 year old boy was convicted of rape.8 3 The victim was also
17 years of age and attended the same high school as the perpetrator. 84 The
85
perpetrator and victim lived in the same neighborhood and were friends.
The Regional Court, East London, applying the Criminal Procedure Act of
2007, imposed the prescribed minimum sentence for rape of ten years imBrandt v. S. [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA) 12 (S. Afr.) (stating that a sentencing
Court can impose a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum sentence in the
case of a convicted person who was between the ages of 16 and 18 when the crime
was committed, if the sentencing Court is satisfied that the prescribed sentence
would be unjust and disproportional to the crime, the criminal and the needs of
society). See also S. v. Gagu & Another 2006 (1) SACR 547 at 551-52 (S. Afr.); S.
v. Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) 34 (S. Afr.).
80 See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Juvenile Sentencing Coming of Age, 16 STELLENBOSCH
79

L.

REV.

98 (2005).

81 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 s. 51(5)(b).
82 Ntaka v The State (469/2007) [2008] ZASCA 30 (28 March 2008) (S. Afr.)
available at http://www.supremecourtofappeal.gov.za/judgments/sca_2008/sca08030.pdf. [hereinafter "Ntaka v. The State". See also The Supreme Court of Appeal:
Republic of South Africa, Media Summary - Judgment Delivered in the Supreme
Court of Appeal, http://www.supremecourtofappeal.gov.za/judgments/sca_2008/
sca08-030%20ms.pdf
3.
83 Ntaka v The State, supra note 82,
84 Id.
85 Id.

92
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prisonment, and suspended four years of the sentence.8 6 The Supreme
Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to five years imprisonment, noting
that correctional supervision requested by the Appellant would not be appropriate in the prevailing circumstances. 87 Justice Edwin Cameron
(Cachalia, J. concurring) noted that during the period the crime was committed (May of 2004) 50,000 rapes were reported in South Africa, of which
7,000 occurred in the Eastern Cape (the region where the crime took
place). 88 He went on to say: "Every rape sentence sends a public message.
This option [correctional supervision] would be so soft that its message
would be misunderstood. It would enable the courts' seriousness in seeking
to punish and deter rapes to be called into question." 89
The constitutionality of this newly enacted provision was recently
challenged in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court of South
Africa by the Centre for Child Law of the University of Pretoria. 90 Acting
Judge Sulet Potterill afforded standing to the Centre to bring the action,
even though its application was not based on the actual prosecution of a
child offender. 9 1 Instead, the application was brought in the name of the
Centre and in the interests of 16 and 17 year old children potentially at risk
of being sentenced to serve a minimum sentence, as well as in the public
interest. 92 The Centre for Child Law is a law clinic registered with the Law
Society of the Northern Provinces of South Africa, and its main objective is
"to establish and promote child law and uphold the rights of children in
South Africa and in particular to use the law and litigation as an instrument
to advance such interests. ' 93 In view of the constitutional provisions proclaiming that every child has the right "not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case . . . the child may be detained for the
shortest appropriate period of time,' 94 and that "[a] child's best interests are
of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child, '95 Acting
86
87
88

89

Id. 11.
Id. [ 41-42.
Id. [41.
Id. 40.

90 Centre for Child Law v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Developnent &
Others (Case No. 11214/08 (Nov. 4, 2008) available at http://www.childlawsa.
com/docs/cases/Centre%20for%2OChild%2OLaw%20v%2OMin%2Oof%20Justice
%20and%200thers.pdf [hereinafter "Center for Child Law"].
91

Id. 1 10.

92

Id.

93 Id.

5.

94

S.

95

Id. s. 28(2).

AFR. CONST.

1996 s. 28(l)(g).
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Judge Potterill decided that the statutory provision prescribing minimum
sentences for a child offender who was between the ages of 16 and 18 years
when the offence was committed was unconstitutional. 96 In South African
constitutional law, all findings of unconstitutionality by a court other than
the Constitutional Court is automatically taken on review by the Constitutional Court. 97 The final decision of the Constitutional Court is currently
98
still pending.
South African law is also particularly sensitive to the needs of a
child victim or witness in criminal proceedings. Legislation dealing with
such matters was recently declared unconstitutional by the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court (Judge Eberhardt Bertelsmann presiding). 99 Judge Bertelsmann noted in that case that the child is "an alien in
the courtroom," and went on to say:
It is a historical fact that our entire legal system was designed by adults for adults, including courts and court procedure .

. .

. Court proceedings are, in colonial tradition,

accompanied by pomp and circumstance, unusual clothing,
robes and formalistic language that would come across as
stilted, artificial, magniloquent and bombastic in any other
setting ....

Children are by their very nature ill-equipped to deal with a
confrontational and adversarial setting in which adults dictate the subject-matter, the nature and the style of the
0
conversation. 10
The problem confronting the Court was in essence that a Section in the
Criminal Procedure Act providing for the appointment of intermediaries for
witnesses under the age of 18 years granted discretion to the trial court to
appoint or not to appoint an intermediary when a child witness was to be
called to testify in a criminal trial. 01' The threshold provision of the Section
required that the child victim should be exposed to "undue" stress and suffering before the services of an intermediary "may" be considered. The Act
96

Centre for Child Law, supra note 90,

27.

S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 167(5) (providing that the Constitutional Court "must
confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High
Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any force").
98 Centre for Child Law v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development &
Others, Case No. CCT 98 (2009).
99 S. v. Mokoena 2008 (5) S.A. 578 (T) (S. Afr.).
100 Id. at 593-94.
10 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s. 170A(1).
97
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further contemplated that the Court might refuse to appoint an intermediary
even in the case of a very young child victim about to be called as a complainant witness. 10 2 In pronouncing these provisions unconstitutional,
Judge Bertelsmann said:
It is... difficult to fathom why the legislature should have
seen fit to demand that the child victim should be exposed
to 'undue' stress and suffering before the services of an intermediary may be considered. This threshold provision
places a limitation upon the best interests of the child that is
neither rational nor justifiable when weighed up against the
legitimate concerns of the accused, the court and the public
interest. The child is entitled as of right to a procedure that
eliminates as much as possible of the anguish that accompanies the necessity of having to relive the horror of abuse,
violation, rape, assault or deprivation that the child experienced when he or she became a victim or a witness. To
demand a extraordinary measure of stress or anguish before
the assistance of an intermediary can be called upon clearly
discriminates against the child and is constitutionally
untenable. 103
The court reformulated the Section - as courts of law may do in South
Africa when declaring a statutory provision unconstitutional - to make the
appointment of a competent intermediary mandatory in all cases where
"any witness under the biological ... age of eighteen years is to testify, ...
unless there are cogent reasons not to appoint such intermediary, in which
event the court shall place such reasons on record before the commencement of the proceedings," and authorizing the court to appoint a competent
intermediary for "a witness under the mental age of eighteen years."' 4 The
provision affording to a court the power to refuse to appoint an intermediary for a child victim about to be called as a complainant witness was sim05
ply declared unconstitutional (without any substitute formulation).1
Other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act declared unconstitutional include: ones distinguishing between cases involving a child accused, and a child victim or witness, in regard to the discretion of the court
102 Id. s. 170A(7) (providing that the Court must provide reasons for refusing to
order the appointment of an intermediary in respect of a child complainant below
the age of 14 years).
103 S. v. Mokoena 2008 (5) S.A. at 599.
104 Id. at 613.
105 Id. at 599.
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to order that proceedings be held behind closed doors;10 6 one that makes
provision for witnesses or an accused to give evidence by means of closed
circuit television or similar electronic media; 0 7 and one relating to the taking of the oath or an affirmation to tell the truth and which in effect prevented children who cannot convey an appreciation of the abstract concepts
of truth and falsehood to the court from testifying. 08 Judge Bertelsmann
stated in the latter context that the provision in question "does not take into
account that a witness who, for whatever reason, may not be able to understand or to verbalise an understanding of the abstract intellectual concepts
of truth or falsehood, may nonetheless be perfectly able to convey the experience that has led to the witness becoming involved in the criminal trial."' 0 9
The judgment of Bertelsmann, J. was not confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 110 The Constitutional Court decided in essence that the provisions of the law relating to child witnesses were not an issue that
emanated from the facts in the case before the Court."' The Court nevertheless decided to consider the constitutionality of the provisions concerned, because merely deciding that the High Court overstepped its
authority by considering their constitutionality could send the wrong message. 12 It decided on the merits that the statutory provisions condemned by
Id. at 604, 613-14. The Court substituted "the court must" for "the court may"
and deleted a phrase making a ruling by the Court subject to a request of the parent
of guardian.
107 Id. at 605. The Act authorized the court to refuse the giving of evidence by
children other than through electronic means if such means were readily available.
The Act compelled the court to give reasons to refuse electronic evidence if the
child "complainant" was below the age of 14. The Court now ordered that reference to a person below the age of 14 be deleted, as well as the reference to "complainant," thereby compelling the court to give reasons in all instances for refusing
an application to permit a vulnerable child to testify through close circuit television
or other similar means.
108 Id. at 606.
109 S. v. Mokoena 2008 (5) S.A. at 607.
110 See Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others, Case No. CCT 36/08 [2009] ZACC 8 (April 1,
2009) [hereinafter "Director of Public Prosecutions"].
" I d.
40 (holding that "the constitutional issue sought to be raised must arise on
the facts of the case before the court"); id. In 48-49 (holding that it was inappropriate for the High Court to raise constitutional issues not dictated by the facts in the
case); id. 9155-57 (noting that certain provisions declared unconstitutional by the
High Court were still in bill form before Parliament and dealing with them prematurely implicated the separation of powers).
112 Id.
[ 64-65.
106
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the High Court were not unconstitutional. The essence of the Constitutional
Court's reasoning was that affording to a judicial officer the discretion to
appoint an intermediary for a child witness, and distinguishing between a
child complainant and a child witness, did not violate the best interest of the
child criterion stipulated by international law and embodied in the South
African Constitution." 3 "In a matter involving a child," the Court decided,
"the conferral of judicial discretion enables the courts, on a case-by-case
' 14
basis, to determine whether the services of an intermediary are required." "
The Court, having noted that "It]he child complainant and the child accused
are not similarly situated," 115 rejected the supposition that differentiating
between a child accused and child complainants or child witnesses was irrational." 6 The Constitutional Court was concerned, however, about evidence presented that indicated a lack of facilities in some jurisdictions to
properly train or have available intermediaries for child witnesses, particularly in cases involving children who were complainants of sexual offences. 117 The Court consequently instructed the Director-General of the
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to furnish the Court
with certain information, for example how many intermediaries each Regional Court requires to meet its needs, what steps are being taken to ensure
that each Regional Court has the number of intermediaries necessary to
meet its needs, the availability of separate rooms from which a child witness may testify, the available closed circuit facilities and one-way mirrors,
and the steps being taken to provide such facilities where they do not exist. 118 The information must be provided before July 1, 2009.119
II.

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The American criminal justice system deviates in many respects
from principles that have come to be accepted as sentencing directives in
enlightened systems of law. In the U.S., exclusive emphasis is placed, for

116

T 129.
Director of Public Prosecutions, T 124.
Id. 142.
Id. 151.

117

Id.

113 Id.
1"4
115

I'l Id.
l 9 Id.

200-05.
206, 208(c), 209 (e).
209(e).
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sentencing purposes, on the gravity of the crime. 120 In Solem v. Helms, it
was decided that proportionality of a punishment to the offence is determined with three criteria in mind: "(i) the gravity of the offence and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals [for
offences of the same gravity] in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions." 1 21 The essence of the penal policy in Solem was subsequently overruled in Harmelin
v. Michigan, where Justice Scalia decided that "the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality guarantee"; 22 that taking into account mitigating factors for sentencing purposes "has no support in the text and history
of the Eighth Amendment"; 123 and "[s]evere, mandatory penalties may be
cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history. 1' 24 Individualization of sentencing to fit the crime, the criminal, and the interests of
society-which have become the international standard of penology-is
thus not part of the American sentencing philosophy. In addition, as noted
in the introductory paragraphs of this essay, prosecuting and punishing
juveniles as adults are commonplace in the U.S.
Some state courts seem more inclined than others to consider the
culpability of juvenile offenders when it comes to sentencing. In Workman
v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that life imprisonment
without the option of parole of two 14 year old children convicted of rape
"shocks the general conscience of society today and is intolerable to fundamental fairness."' 125 In Naovarath v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court similarly condemned a life sentence imposed on a 13 year old child convicted of
murder, holding that "[c]hildren are and should be judged by different standards from those imposed upon mature adults."' 126 In State v. Massey, the
Washington State Court of Appeal, by contrast, confirmed the life sentence
of a 13-year-old convicted of first degree murder, holding that in determining "whether in view of contemporary standards of elementary decency, the
punishment is of such disproportionate character to the offense as to shock
the general conscience and violate principles of fundamental fairness," the
120 See, e.g., Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (holding that "it is a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offence").
121
122
123
124
125
126

463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).

Id. at 994.
Id. at 994-95.
429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
779 P.2d 944, 946-47 (Nev. 1989).
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convicted person's age is not an element to be considered; the inquiry must
instead be confined to "a balance between the crime and the sentence imposed. 1 27 The Court confirmed that "there is no cause to create a distinction between a juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life without
' 128
parole for first degree aggravated murder."
The U.S. has been condemned on many occasions for not complying with its international commitments, ranging from acts of aggression to
its failure, almost as a matter of course, to comply with its obligations under
the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations to inform an alien arrested or
detained in the U.S. on criminal charges of his or her right to contact the
consulate of the country of his or her nationality. 129 Its juvenile criminal
justice system has also been at issue many times before international tribu30
nals. Consider, for example, the case of Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton.1
On December 16, 1977, Roach was sentenced to death by a criminal court of South Carolina for the rape and murder of a 14 year old girl and
the murder of her 17 year old boyfriend.' 3 ' At more or less the same time,
Pinkerton was sentenced to death in Texas on charges of murder and attempted rape. 32 Roach and Pinkerton were both 17 years old at the time
the crimes were committed. 133 Complaints were lodged on their behalf
before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, based on the submission that the execution of persons who were juveniles at the time the
offence was committed violated the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man of 1948.134
The Commission concluded at the time that there was a rule of
international law with the force of jus cogens applying to Member States of
the Organization of American States which prohibits the execution of chil"' However, the Commission was convinced by the U.S. "that there
dren. 35
does now not exist a norm of customary international law establishing 18 to
127

803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).

128

Id.

129

Johan D. van der Vyver, American ForeignPolicy: Prejudicesand Responsibil-

ities of the Sole Surviving Superpower in the World, 2005 J. Sou. Aim. L 435, 435-

47 (2005).
130 Roach & Pinkerton v. U.S., Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 3/87,
OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1986-87) [hereinafter "Roach & Pinkerton"].
131Id.
132

133
134
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Id. 4.
Id. 23, 30.
Id. 6.
Id. 56.
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be the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty," though the Com136
mission was of the opinion that a rule to that effect was emerging.
However, the Commission went on to hold that the arrangements in
the U.S. as to juvenile executions violated the norm of equal justice laid
down in Article II of the Declaration. 137 The different arrangements that
applied in the states of the U.S. in regard to the death penalty were the basis
of this finding. 3 8 Those arrangements made imposition of the death penalty for the same crime dependent on the place where the crime was committed, with perhaps only the side of a river where the act took place as the
fortuitous divide between a penalty of life or death. The Commission summarized its views as follows:
For the federal Government of the United States to leave
the issue of the application of the death penalty to juveniles
to the discretion of State officials results in a patchwork
scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the punishment dependent, not, primarily, on the nature of the
crime committed, but on the location where it was committed. Ceding to state legislatures the determination of
whether a juvenile may be executed is not of the same category as granting states the discretion to determine the age
of majority for purposes of purchasing alcoholic beverages
or consenting to matrimony. The failure of the federal government to preempt the states as regards this most fundamental right - the right to life - results in a pattern of

legislative arbitrariness throughout the United States which
results in arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before
the law, contrary to Articles I and II of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, respectively. 13 9
Roach and Pinkerton were executed while their case was pending before the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. 140 That, in the opinion of
the Commission, constituted a violation of the right of the applicants to life
14
and to equal protection of the laws.
Since the holding in Roach and Pinkerton was handed down in
1987, two things relevant to that holding changed. First, the Inter-Ameri-

137

Roach & Pinkerton, supra note 130,
Id. 1 65.
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Id.
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can Commission of Human Rights subsequently decided that a rule of customary international law had in the mean time been established pin-pointing
the age upon which a person may be exposed to the death penalty at 18
years; 142 and second, in the case of Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme
Court not so long ago decided with a slight majority of 5 to 4 that sentencing a person to death for a crime committed while the perpetrator was under
the age of 18 constituted a cruel and unusual punishment and was therefore
43

unconstitutional. 1

The U.S. is one of only two countries in the world that have not
ratified the CRC, the other one being Somalia. 44 Since the early 1990's
Somalia has been in a state of anarchy and simply does not have a government to ratify the CRC. The U.S. is therefore in this regard in a sense the
odd man out.
Human rights protagonists from time to time attempt to persuade
U.S. officials to support ratification of the CRC.145 The judgment in Roper
v. Simmons has afforded new impetus to those attempts. President Elect
Barack Obama (as he then was) has stated that the failure of the U.S. to
146
ratify the CRC is "embarrassing" and promised to review the matter.
The Roper decision indeed represents a giant step forward in bringing the American criminal justice system up to international standards but
does not resolve the equal protection/non-discrimination dilemma that still
remains an obstacle to ratification by the U.S. of the CRC. The great diversity at the states level of rules regulating the prosecution of juveniles for
serious crimes as though they were adults may be cited in this regard.
The problem confronting the U.S. derives from the fact that its federal Bill of Rights has been confined to the protection of civil and political
rights only, to the exclusion of the most fundamental natural rights of the
individual, such as the right to life and to human dignity. In the U.S. the
right of parents to withhold life-sustaining medication or therapeutic treat142 Domingues v. U.S., Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, [ 64,83,85 (2002).
143

543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005).

'44

Id. at 576.

See Don S. Browning, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Should It be Ratified, and Why?, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 157 (2006); Martin Guggenheim, Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, But Don't
Expect Any Miracles, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 43 (2006).
146 Senator Barack H. Obama, Address at the Walden University Presidential
Youth Debate (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://debate.waldenu.edu/debatetranscript.
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ment from a child in their care has had a checkered history. 147 There are, on
the one hand, state laws in place that exempt parents who prefer spiritual
treatment or faith healing from statutory requirements to furnish health care
to a child in their care, 148 but this concession to freedom of religion will not
absolve a parent from criminal liability for involuntary manslaughter if the
child should die in consequence of being denied conventional medical treatment.1 49 Parents will therefore be prosecuted for providing spiritual treatment for their children in lieu of traditional medical care, but only if such
50
treatment turned out to be ineffective and resulted in death of the child.
In South Africa, on the other hand, the High Court as upper guardian of all
children can intervene by sanctioning a feasible medical procedure while
In South Africa, the constitutionthe life of the child can still be saved.'
ally protected right to life of the child will in all circumstances trump the
claim to the exercise of religious liberty of the parent.
The American federal system and, more precisely, the sovereign
powers of the states, are commonly held out as an excuse for inequalities in
the protection of the law afforded in regard to some of the most fundamental human rights. However, in international law the U.S. constitutes a single political entity and it is consequently required to uphold the customarylaw norm of equal protection in regard to all fundamental rights and freedoms within its entire territorial domain. The U.S. Supreme Court indeed
possesses wide powers to read those fundamental rights and freedoms into
the general language of the Bill of Rights - as most recently evidenced by
the judgment in Roper. However, the absence of equal protection of the
laws in the American juvenile criminal justice system, which clearly constitutes an insurmountable obstacle preventing ratification by the U.S. of the
CRC, cannot be resolved by either the federal legislature or the U.S. Supreme Court.
Federal legislation that seeks to regulate matters which, under the
American Constitution have been reserved for the states, including the juve152
nile criminal justice system, will without question be unconstitutional.
Punishments prescribed by the states can only be declared unconstitutional
See Edward Egan Smith, The Criminalizationof Belief: When Free Exercise
Isn't, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (1991).
147

Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P. 2d 852, 858 (1988) (referencing Section 270
of the Californian Penal Code).
148

Id. at 878.
See John Dwight Ingram, State Interference with Religiously Motivated Decisions on Medical Treatment, 93 DICK. L. REV. 41, 59 (1988).
149

150

151See
152

Hay v. B & Others 2003 (3) S.A. 492 (W) at 495 (S.Afr.).
CONST. amend. X.

See U.S.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15

102

if they are found to be cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. 53 The death penalty is always a cruel punishment; the question is whether that punishment for juveniles is unusual.
Roper has again confirmed that "unusual punishments" do not denote those that are unusual in the world, or the Western world, but are
confined to punishments found to be unusual within the U.S. The majority
opinion in Roper was therefore based on the premise that a sufficient number of states had abolished the death penalty in instances of juvenile offenders so as to render juvenile executions "unusual" and therefore
unconstitutional.154 The minority judged that the states within the U.S. that
still sanctioned juvenile executions were enough in number to retain the
death penalty for juvenile offenders in the concerned states. 155 The problem
that will confront the U.S. Supreme Court if it were to take the prosecution
of juveniles as adults under advisement is the simple fact that every single
state within the U.S. currently still upholds that practice. If that practice is
not "unusual" within the U.S., it does not violate the Eighth Amendment
and can therefore not be declared unconstitutional.
One must consequently conclude that the U.S. cannot ratify the
The
U.S. as a matter of course always add a so-called "federalism
CRC.
clause" to its instruments of ratification of human rights treaties, thereby
excluding the validity for the U.S. of any provision in the treaty dealing
with matters which under the American Constitution falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.156 In the present context, a federalism clause
would not be advisable, or indeed feasible. The provision in the CRC demanding of States Parties to secure the rights enumerated in it "to each
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind"'157 is so
fundamental to the entire Convention that a reservation seeking to exclude
this demand would most certainly be "incompatible with the object and
purpose" of the CRC and thus fall foul of Article 19(1) of the Vienna Con158
vention on the Law of Treaties.

153 See
154

U.S.

CONST.

amend. VIII.

543 U.S. at 564-65.
595-96 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 607-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

155Id. at

Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 341, 341 (1995).
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supra note 59, art. 2(1).
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN DILEMMA:
PRINCIPLES FROM THE

103

IMPOSING HUMAN RIGHTS

Top

DOWN

As far as international standards for the promotion and protection of
children's rights are concerned, South Africa can walk tall. It ratified the
CRC on 16 July 1995, and did so without any reservations. 159 It might be
noted as a point of interest that certain other countries that uphold plural
legal arrangements for different population groups have been more circumspect in this regard. Canada, for example, entered a reservation to a provision of the CRC dealing with adoption (art. 21) to fully accommodate
"customary forms of care among aboriginal peoples of Canada," and in a
statement of understanding interpreted its obligation to take legislative, administrative and other measures to implement the rights enunciated in the
CRC (art. 4) to be conditioned by the right to self-determination of ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities "or persons of indigenous origin" as regulated in Article 30 of the CRC. 160 Pluralistic arrangements to accommodate
indigenous laws and practices of Aborigines probably also prompted a reservation by New Zealand "to continue to distinguish as it considers appropriate in its laws and practice between persons according to the nature of
61
their authority to be in New Zealand."'
The South African Constitution does protect the right to self-determination of ethnic, religious and linguistic communities, 62 and through its
unqualified ratification of the CRC, its Government has contracted an international obligation to also uphold the right to self-determination of children.
Article 30 of the Convention proclaims and defines this right in compelling
terms:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such minority or who is indigenous shall not be
denied the right, in community with other members of his
or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and
practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own
language. 163
159 Reservations, Declarations and Objections Relating to the Convention on the

Rights of the Child, South Africa, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/2/Rev. 8 (Dec. 7, 1999).
160 Reservations, Declarations and Objections Relating to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Canada, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/2/Rev. 8 (Dec. 7, 1999).
161 Reservations, Declarations and Objections Relating to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/2/Rev. 8 (Dec. 7, 1999).
162 S.AFR. CONST. 1996 §31, 235.
163 CRC, supra note 59, art. 30.
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The Children's Act 38 of 2005 sought to uphold this right vesting in a child
by proclaiming that "[e]very child that is of such an age, maturity and stage
of development as to be able to participate in any matter concerning that
child has the right to participate in an appropriate way and views expressed
by the child must be given due consideration." 164 Even before this provision entered into force on July 1, 2007, the right of parents to dictate to their
children the religion they should adhere to upon reaching a stage in their
development when they can decide for themselves has been placed under
constraint. A case in point is one where the Transvaal Provincial Division
of the High Court refused to make a provision in a divorce settlement agreement an order of Court in terms of which both parties undertook to educate
their minor child (then tree years of age) in the Apostolic Church and to see
to it that the child fully participate in all religious activities of that
Church.1 65 Acting Judge Fabricious stated in that case that forcing a child
by an order of the parents or by an order of Court to partake fully in stipulated religious activities would not uphold the right of the child "to his full
development," which the Judge held was "a right . . . implicit in the
1

66

Constitution."
The right to self-determination of children must not be taken out of
context. It is important to emphasize that South African law places a high
premium on the family environment. The Constitutional Court on one occasion observed: "The parents have a general interest in living their lives in
a community setting according to their religious beliefs, and a more specific
167
interest in directing the education of their children."'
The new Children's Act also emphasizes "the need for a child to be
brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family
environment."' 168 And this, again, is in conformity with international-law
standards. The InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights recognizes the family as "the natural and fundamental group unit" of society and
proclaims that it must as such be protected by society and the State. 169 The
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in similar

165

Children's Act 38 of 2005, s. 10.
Kotze v. Kotze 2003 (3) S.A. 628 (T) (S. Afr.).
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Christian Education, South Africa v. Minister of Education 2000 (4) S.A. 757
(CC) at 768 (S. Afr.).
168 Children's Act 38 of 2005 s. 7(l)(k).
169 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23(1), G.A. Res.
2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
167

2009

PROTECTION OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

105

vein promises "the widest possible protection and assistance . to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit in society, particularly
• ..while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children." 170 The United Nations Guidelinesfor the Preventionof Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines of 1990) proclaim that "[e]very society
should place a high priority on the needs and well-being of the family and
all its members," 17 ' and call on governments to "establish policies that are
conducive to the bringing up of children in stable and settled family environments."' 72 The Declarationon the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, in dealing with religious rights of a
child, provides that the parents or guardians of a child have the right to
173 It
organize the family life in accordance with their religion or belief.
goes on to provide that the child may have access to education in matters of
religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of the parents or guardians
and may not be compelled to receive teaching in religion or belief which
goes against the wishes of the parents or guardians. 174 If a child is no
longer in the care of his or her parents or legal guardians, their expressed
wishes in matters of religion or belief are to be taken into account. 175 The
practices of religion or belief in which the child is brought up must, under
no circumstances, be detrimental to his or her physical or mental health or
176
to his or her full development.
The Children's Act mostly deals negatively with the right to selfdetermination of the child. It seeks to prohibit, or at least to place constraints upon, cultural practices that violate basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the child. It provides in general that "[e]very child has
the right not to be subjected to social, cultural and religious practices which
are detrimental to his or her well-being," 77 and then goes on to address
particular unbecoming practices, such as female genital mutilation, male
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 10(1),
G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966).
'7' United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, art. 11,
G.A. Res. 45/112, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/112/Annex (Dec. 14, 1990).
172 Id. art. 13.
173 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art. 5(1), G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981).
174 Id. art. 5(2).
175 Id. art. . 5(4).
176 Id. art. 5(5).
177 Children's Act 38 of 2005 s. 12(1).
170
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circumcision, and the proof of virginity. Genital mutilation is altogether
78
prohibited. 1
Male circumcision, based on African (not Jewish) customs, of a
child under the age of 16 is unlawful 179 and requires the consent of boys of
16 years or older. 180 Every male child may in fact refuse to undergo circumcision, depending on the age, maturity and stage of development of the
child. 181
Virginity testing of a girl under the age of 16 years is likewise prohibited. 182 Upon reaching the age of 16, virginity testing may only be performed with the girl's consent. 183 The results of virginity testing may not
be disclosed without the child's permission, 184 and the body of the child
185
who has undergone virginity testing may not be marked.
The provisions pertinent to social, cultural and religious practices
affecting the well-being of a child have not yet entered into force. For that
there are probably two quite different but related reasons.
The first possible reason derives from recent judgments of the Constitutional Court that rendered the constitutionality of legislation dealing
with matters of general public interest dependent on adequate consultation
with the people affected by, or with a special interest in, such legislation. 186
This is important. In virtue of those decisions South Africa is not only a
representative democracy but has also been converted into a consultative
democracy. To the best of my knowledge, this state of affairs has made the
constitutional system of South Africa unique in the entire world.
The consultative component of the South African constitutional
system does not mean that the legislature is bound to give effect to public
preferences. Nor would refusal of the legislature to uphold popular perceptions pertinent to constitutionally protected values violate the democracy
prong of the constitutional system. Democracy has to do with the designation of persons in authority and is not implicated by bona fide efforts of the
repositories of political power to uphold a constitutionally protected value
178

179

Id. s. 12(3).
Id. s. 12(8).

180 Id. s. 12(9).
181 Id. s. 12(10).
182 Id. s. 12(4).
183 Children's Act 38 of 2005 s. 12(5).
184 Id. s. 12(6).
185 Id. s. 12(7).
186 See, e.g. Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the House of Assembly,
2006 (6) S.A. 416 (CC) (S. Afr.); King v. Attorneys' Fidelity Fund Board of Control, 2006 (1) S.A. 474 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
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system. 18 7 The people must be consulted, their views must be considered,
but in the end the constitutional Bill of Rights remains the supreme law of
the land. As stated by President Arthur Chaskalson in the death penalty
case: "The question before us ... is not what the majority of South Africans
believe a proper sentence for murder should be. It is whether the constitu188
tion allows the sentence."'
In this regard South African constitutional law also differs from its
American counterpart. The American Constitution was proclaimed in the
name of "We, the people.. .",189 and the U.S. Supreme Court has taken this
to authorize the interpretation and re-interpretations of the constitutional
Bill of Rights to coincide with the will of the people. 190 Upholding a juvenile criminal justice system which by contemporary standards is, to say the
least, absolutely barbaric, may be justified in the U.S. because that is what
the people want. The U.S. is probably unique in the world in that penal
policy is there an election campaign issue and is therefore decisively influenced by largely uninformed, highly prejudiced and morally debased public
pressures. Election campaigns of the 1990's were particularly prone to
"hard on crime" sentiments, including the deterrence fiction of harsh punishments in the case of juvenile offenders. And, as everyone probably
knows, when people are crying out for justice, they are not really calling for
justice; they are demanding revenge!
The second probable reason why provisions in the Children's Act
dealing with social, cultural and religious practices have been kept on ice is
exactly because of certain discrepancies between the lofty constitutional
principles embodied in the Bill of Rights and actual perceptions and practices of sections of the South African community. Those discrepancies are
evident at three levels: (a) a certain persistent skepticism of sections of the
supporters of the racist oligarchy of yesteryear whose privileged status in
apartheid South Africa was at odds with, and challenged by, the human
rights ideology; (b) the remnants of past discrimination in the facilities, services and support available to past victims of racial discrimination, for ex-

187
188

State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (CC) [ 305, 322 (S. Afr.)
State v. Makwanyane, supra note 187, 87.
Preamble.
See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: An-

189 U.S. CONST.
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other Look, 48 Nw.

UNIv.

L. REv. 16, 31 (1953) (noting that "[t]he tendency of the

Court in the long run to conform to the major movements of public opinion has
frequently been noted").
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ample in the area of public education;1 91 and (c) cultural practices of certain
indigenous communities that are incompatible with the human rights ideology of our time. I shall confine my concluding comments to the latter contingency of the South African status quo.
The systems of human rights protection in the world today can,
from a certain perspective, be divided into two main categories: Those that
have grown from the bottom up, and those that have imposed human rights
values on the political community from the top down.
In countries belonging to the former category, the values embodied
in a Bill of Rights were based upon, and kept track with, an existing and
evolving public ethos. Drafters and law-creating agencies simply endorsed
moral perceptions entertained by a cross-section of the peoples comprising
the nation. The American system of human rights protection may be cited
as an example of this category.
South Africa, on the other hand, belongs to that category of political communities where Bill of Rights decrees have been imposed from the
top down. That is to say, the rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution have been dictated by internationally recognized norms of right and
wrong, which are in many instances not in conformity with the moral perceptions and customary practices of large sections of the South African
population. Some of the laws that have been drafted to implement the principles of human rights from time to time provoke strong voices of protest
from groups within the country whose age-old customs may fall prey to the
concerned legal reform measures. The lives they live and the customs they
observe are in many instances far removed from the nice-sounding ideologies written into the Constitution and specificities reflected in judgments of
the courts. In one of the early judgments of the Constitutional Court, Justice
Mokgoro referred to the "delicate and complex"1 92 task of accommodating
African customary law to the values embodied in the Bill of Rights, and
noted that "[t]his harmonization will demand a great deal of judicious care
' 93
and sensitivity."'
Effective implementation of the human-rights-based laws and judgments within the entire country will in the final analysis be conditioned by
the cultivation of a human-rights ethos as a stronghold of all peoples and in
all tribal communities of the South African "rainbow nation". In this respect South Africa still has many more miles to run.
See, e.g., Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re The Constitutionality
of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 (3) S.A.
165, 189 (CC) (S. Afr.).
192 Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (5) S.A. 658 (CC) (S. Afr.).
193 Id.
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